Thoughts on the current worldwide economic downturn

Posted 2009-01-08 by Jeffrey Brown
Categories: Ecology, Economics

To call this a philosophy post is a bit of a stretch, unless you squint your eyes tightly and accept these premises: most academic disciplines trace their roots back to philosophy, and their subject matter remains appropriate fodder for philosphical inquiry.

I began my undergraduate education as a biology major, intending to emphasize on population- or ecosystem-scale study and eventually earn a graduate degree in ecology. I dreamed of spending years living in a canvas wall tent, with all the comforts of a Boy Scout camp, exhaustively studying different ecosystems.

I have long been concerned that human population growth would continue, unchecked by natural predators or distasteful proactive means of controlling our numbers, until we exceeded the earth’s carrying capacity for human life. We wouldn’t destroy the earth, just damage its ability to support human life. I’ve always believed that that “natural correction” of human population would occur in a manner that would be particularly devastating in those parts of the world with the highest standards of living. After all, we had the farthest to fall before those of us who survived found ourselves back in the Paleolithic Age. The recent prosperity of India and China, and the resulting increase in their per-capita use of finite resources, could only hasten the population correction and drastically increase the percentage of the world’s population that would be hardest hit by it.

I believe that the recent changes in worldwide economic conditions could be viewed as a massive “correction,” in stock market parlance, brought about by a significant portion of the world’s population living beyond its means in very literal terms – living at an ecologically unsustainable level. What began as an apparent housing crisis is not a simple crisis in housing. It is a crisis in housing at the American standard of living, which is a level of resource consumption far beyond that which is required to meet the needs of life. In the United States alone, providing comfortable and simple shelter, clean water, a healthy diet, and a parcel of land to enable a degree of self-sufficiency for every man, woman, and child would be less expensive and have a more lasting effect than the taxpayers’ involuntary bailout of the financial sector and whatever other industries manage to win the favor of Congress. Also unlike the financial bailout, using the money to provide the necessities of life to real people, rather than funding the mistakes of corporations, could provide protection against the possibility that this economic correction is merely a precursor to an ecological correction. If we as as nation or as a species don’t proactively get and keep ourselves within the world’s carrying capacity for human life, it will happen anyway and not at a time or in a manner of our choosing…and it may well be sooner rather than later. Sustainability may seem expensive and may make politicians and bankers cringe, but it’s cheaper than starvation.


Beliefs are ethically neutral: a response to W.K Clifford

Posted 2008-11-17 by Jeffrey Brown
Categories: Ethics, Philosophy

Tags: ,

I. Introduction

W.K. Clifford argued that one has not only an epistemic responsibility, but also an ethical duty, to hold a given belief only with sufficient evidence. In responding to Clifford’s essay “The Ethics of Belief,” I will address only Clifford’s ethical claims regarding beliefs. Clifford’s claims about epistemic rights will not be considered. Specifically, I intend to show that actions alone have an ethical character and that beliefs alone are not subject to ethical judgments. A public belief, a belief that is shared with or taught to others, is considered to be an act, or a portion of the act of sharing or teaching. Private beliefs can be divided into private motivating beliefs (PMBs) or purely private beliefs (PPBs). Clifford’s example of the shipowner’s belief that his vessel was not seaworthy is an example of a PMB. An example of a PPB would be the opinion of a non-expert that Venus, rather than Saturn (Ingersoll), is the windiest planet in our solar system. PMBs can affect the ethical character of the act that follows from the belief, particularly in the case of a blameworthy act, in which case the PMB can either aggravate or mitigate the “wrongness”, for want of a more precise word, of the prohibited act.

II. My Ethical System

In this paper, I will analyze W.K. Clifford’s “Ethics of Belief” using an ethical system on which I have been working slowly for several years. It is by no means complete, and much of it will likely sound very familiar to the reader. This in not by accident: my fledgling ethical theory stands humbly on the shoulders of giants. To the extent that the origins of derivative parts are not properly attributed to their creators, it is solely because they have been in my thought for so long that I have forgotten the source from which I absorbed them. I explicitly acknowledge that my ethical theory is not composed completely of my original thought and is, in this stage, little more than a minor refinement of rights-based ethics.

To briefly sketch the current state of my ethical theory, the terms “ethical” and moral” are considered equivalent and may be used interchangeably. Only actions by free moral agents may be the subject of ethical analysis or judgment. Such actions fall into one of the following categories: ethically prohibited, ethically neutral (but permitted), ethically required, or supererogatory. Actions alone, not persons, can be evaluated. Rights may be either positive or negative, and for each right, there is a corresponding duty (e.g., if person A has a right to X, some person B has a duty to provide X). A group can be said to have a particular right or duty if and only if at least one person in the group has that right or duty. It is obviously possible to make all sorts of claims regarding rights and duties, and a cohesive manner for evaluating those claims is an unfinished part of theory. However, borrowing from Kant’s first formulation of his Categorical Imperative, one cannot claim the existence of a particular right unless he can genuinely claim, without a logical or physical inconsistency that all people have that right. This obviously raises the bar significantly for claims to positive rights. Another key concept of my theory is that ethically prohibited acts are those that cause unjustified harm. As with rights and duties, a group or society cannot be said to be harmed unless at least one member of the group, other than the actor, is harmed. Acts that harm the actor are not considered ethically prohibited, as a free moral agent, by definition, acts in accordance with his own intent and self-interest. A person who harms  himself as a result of coercion or mental illness is not a free moral agent and therefore cannot commit an act that has an ethical character.

III. Clifford’s Argument

W.K. Clifford’s “Ethics of Belief” can be satisfactorily condensed by using his own summation: “[t]o sum it up; it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (Clifford 363). In his essay, Clifford denies the very existence of PPBs, claiming that “…no one man’s belief is in any case a private matter which concerns himself alone” (Clifford 361). He offers no evidence in support of this claim, and the following example provides a sufficient argument to topple this claim. Most people, if asked which planet is the windiest, would have no idea, and their mistake or lack of this knowledge affects the operation of society not at all. Prior to NASA’s Cassini mission to Saturn, the scientific astronomy community believed that mantle of “windiest” belonged to Neptune. As is the nature of science, new information led to a new conclusion, but it necessarily implies that the previous information was insufficient. It would be absurd to conclude that scientists at NASA or educators had committed an ethically prohibited act by disseminating to the then-current knowledge that Neptune was the windiest planet. It is difficult to conceive of someone being harmed by another person’s silently holding such a belief.

IV. Other Scholars’ Arguments Regarding Clifford and My Response

Most of the scholarly work found during my search for secondary sources on Clifford was concerned with the epistemic aspect of his claim and was therefore outside the scope of this paper. William James stands out as a philosopher who opposes Clifford’s claims in the realm of ethics. In the case of beliefs involving ethics, James turns Clifford’s argument against itself: “[m]oral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solutions cannot wait for sensible proof. A moral question is not a question of what sensibly exists, but of what is good, or would be good if it did exist” (James 373). To start here and follow Clifford’s argument to its conclusion, it would be unjust for Clifford to hold a belief about whether anything at all is unjust.  Michael Shaffer comes to Clifford’s defense, citing C.S. Peirce’s publicity of belief argument, which states that “bona fide belief cannot be conceptually separated from action. In other words, bona fide beliefs are those upon which one is prepared to act” (Shaffer 41).

The belief to which Shaffer and Peirce refer appears to coincide with a belief that has the potential to become a PNM, which would place it in the sphere of ethical concern. PNMs are outside the scope of my thesis, but the mere preparedness to act upon a PPB, if the eventuality arose, is not sufficient to make it a PNM, absent the action itself. Mental preparedness or willingness to act is not an act in itself. Shaffer muddies the waters by inferring that Clifford’s thesis is purely epistemic: “[i]t is always (epistemically) wrong to believe anything on the basis of insufficient evidence” (Shaffer 45). This inference is not supported by Clifford’s essay.

V. Conclusion

The sources of our beliefs are too numerous for practical enumeration. Some are the products of events that occurred so early in our lives that we cannot remember them. Many are the results of what we experience in our daily lives, which is partially determined by the society into which we happen to be born. We form beliefs based on our sensory information, and our beliefs are affected by our mental and emotional states. Of all of those influences, each person can have complete, and privileged, knowledge of only his own thoughts and emotions. In every other aspect of life, he must act on incomplete and perhaps incorrect information.  Ethics generally does not require one to trivially cast his life aside. One acts based at least in part on what he believes, and requiring him to suspend all belief, and therefore all action, until he possesses complete information amounts to the same thing. It is sufficient that one acts with benevolent intent and with thoughtful consideration of the available evidence, however incomplete it may be.
To review my argument:
P1: Only acts by a free moral agent have an ethical character.
P2:  PPBs are not acts.
C: PPBs cannot have an ethical character.
Since PPBs are incapable of causing harm to another, they are outside the proper sphere of ethics. It may be that our minds may be our only truly free domains, and I believe I have shown that they are also truly private, their contents beyond the reach of the ethical pronouncements of others. The ignorant man deserves no condemnation simply because he is ignorant, and the wise man must go beyond the mere possession of wisdom in order to be ethically praiseworthy.

Works Cited

Clifford, W.K.. “The Ethics of Belief.” In The Philosophy of Religion Reader, edited by Chad Meister,
359-365. New York: Routledge, 2008.

Feldman, Richard. “The Ethics of Belief.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, no. 3
(2000): 667-695.

James, William. “The Will to Believe.” In The Philosophy of Religion Reader, edited by Chad Meister,
366-378. New York: Routledge, 2008.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. “Two Storms Caught in the Act on Saturn.” National
Aeronautics and Space Administration.
3, 2008)

Shaffer, Michael J.. “The Publicity of Belief, Epistemic Wrongs and Moral Wrongs.” Social
20, no. 1 (2006): 41-54.

Zamulinski, Brian. “A Re-evaluation of Clifford and His Critics.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy
40, no. 3 (2002): 437-457.

A work in progress: a response to W.K Clifford’s “Ethics of Belief”

Posted 2008-11-14 by Jeffrey Brown
Categories: Ethics, Philosophy

For my Philosophy of Religion course, I am working on a paper that will be a response to W.K. Clifford’s “Ethics of Belief.” If you’re unfamiliar with Clifford, I’m not going to spoil the surprise. Once the paper is completed, I intend to publish it here – almost certainly by the end of 2008.

I’m also working on a paper on Aristotle’s thought on natural justice and the best type of government. I have not decided whether it will be “re-polished” and published here.

A brief note on animal “rights”

Posted 2008-05-30 by Jeffrey Brown
Categories: Ethics, Non-human animals


As one might guess from other posts, I consider wildlife conservation, preservation of the world’s remaining wild places, and tree-hugging in general to be good things.

Does that, gentle reader, mean that I am a proponent of animal rights? Ummm, no. While I allow causes that I support to leak occasionally onto this blog, at the end of the day it remains a space to discuss ethics. Books could be written about what delineates a person as a free moral agent and, by extension, subject to a particular system or theory of ethics. For our purposes, it is sufficient to say that the individual must be able to understand his or her ethical rights and duties and must be free to choose his or her actions.

Even the non-human animals closest to us in terms of intelligence or ability to communicate with humans fails the first criterion. The second, therefore, need not be examined. Chimpanzees, elephants, or cetaceans may be moral agents with respect to other members of the same species, but they are not moral agents with respect to humans. If they owe no ethical duty to humans, then we are arguably free of any ethical duty to them.

The matter of reciprocity as it applies to ethics is an interesting subject for future investigation.

Humans’ role in the extinction of other species is an example of our capacity to behave badly outside in a way that is ethically neutral within the confines of ethical theory.

Philosophy for children?

Posted 2008-04-09 by Jeffrey Brown
Categories: Education, Philosophy

Tags: ,

Recently, I posted a question on LinkedIn regarding teaching philosophy in primary and secondary schools. It led to a series of amazing conversations with over two dozen respondents. My idea wasn’t to teach a philosophy class in, say, second grade, but rather to emphasize critical thinking throughout the existing curriculum. Children are naturally inquisitive and skeptical, but when their “why” is answered with some variant of “because that’s just the way it is”, it’s not surprising that they eventually stop asking. One respondent’s suggestion, which I particularly like, is to ease children into a more formal awareness of ethics by explaining (or better yet, having the children explain) the reasons for the classroom rules. Another respondent felt that greater awareness of critical thinking and informal logic might be seen by some parents as undermining their religious beliefs.

Putting aside for now the barriers to implementing such an idea, would you support such a “No Child Left Unable to Think” proposal?

A non-theoretical crisis

Posted 2008-01-31 by Jeffrey Brown
Categories: Anthropology, Compassion, Cultural Anthropology, Ecology, Ethics, Non-human animals

Tags: , ,

I have always maintained that humans and non-human animals cannot be moral agents with respect to one another. A human has no rights or duties among non-human animals, and in the strict sense, vice versa.

One could craft a very plausible argument that we each have a duty to our fellow humans, individually and collectively, to damage our habitat as little as possible to meet our needs. Essentially, “don’t shit in camp.” Well, with 6 billion of us, camp is nearly everywhere, and not all of us are doing our duty.

While this doesn’t relate directly to ethics among humans, PLEASE take a moment and visit the site of the Great Apes Survival Project, a project of the United Nations Environment Programme, and see how close we are to losing our nearest relatives, from whom we still have so much to learn, forever. I have no connection with this organization other than a shared goal. The link will open in a new browser tab or window.

A parting thought: This is not nature taking its course. For the most part, this is not an impoverished farmer competing with primates for the same resources for survival. This is a multinational corporation destroying habitat inside national parks, using not only bulldozers, but also mercenaries with automatic weapons to kill the under-trained, under-armed, under-supported park rangers.

Would a multinational corporation do this because it dislikes national parks, or because it makes tremendous profits selling the fruits of its crimes to you and me, here in North America and Europe? Think back a decade, and imagine how you would have responded to such a situation. Now think forward a decade, and imagine a world in which there is no such thing as a wild orangutan or western lowland gorilla. A decade. Yes, it is that close.

Ethics of Computing – What’s a sysadmin to do?

Posted 2008-01-30 by Jeffrey Brown
Categories: Ethics of Computing, Information Technology

Tags: , , ,

One of the areas in which my philosophical interests and my informations systems interests have collided is the ethics of system or network administration. The system administrators, or sysadmins, are the ones who can read your mail, track your web browsing, etc., and you would never know it. They may even have the access to alter their tracks and make their activities less visible to other sysadmins. Obviously, it is a position for which you’d want a person worthy of a tremendous amount of trust.

By its nature, a sysadmin’s job often requires that she come in contact with privileged information. If the email stops flowing, the cause must be found and fixed before the users/customers arrive with the torches and pitchforks. Often, a single message is “hung” in the mail queue. By this point, the sysadmin has already seen the sender, recipient, and subject line. The message must be moved. Do I bounce it back to the sending server to try again? Do I delete the message? What if I can’t contact my user (either sender or recipient)? Do I open it and read it anyway before making a decision to delete it from the queue? What if the user is my romantic partner?

When I worked at a site where I was the ONLY sysadmin, I had to face decisions like those everyday and deal with them quickly. My workload, with 200+ users, would have supported three senior sysadmins. I always tried to err on the side of individual privacy (except that I was unforgiving in my automated hunt for weak user passwords). Just by the nature of how my firewall was set up, my logs contained web surfing history that I could match to a particular PC. A department head had a problem with his employees misusing their internet access in the middle of the night, and he wanted my log information to use in disciplining his miscreants. While I told him I could and would happily restrict his department’s internet access according to any criteria he could possibly come up with, there was no published policy that authorized me to release a user’s web usage information, and he left empty-handed.

What would you do? How would you handle the potential conflicts of interest that lurk literally everywhere? Why?